Donnellan’s Distinction and a Computational Model of Reference

DONNELLAN'S DISTINCTION AND A COMPUTATIONAL MODEL OF REFERENCE Amichai Kronfeld Artificial Intelligence Center SRI International and 333 Ravenswood Avenue Menlo Park, CA 94025 kronfeld~sri-warbucks Center for the Study of Language and Information Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 ABSTRACT In this paper, I describe how Donnellan's distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions should be represented in a computational model of reference. After briefly discussing the significance of Donnellan's distinction, I reinterpret it as being three-tiered, relating to object represen- tation, referring intentions, and choice of rehrring expression. I then present a cognitive model of referring, the components of which correspond to this analysis, and discuss the interac- tion that takes place among those components. Finally, the implementation of this model, now in progress, is described. INTRODUCTION It is widely acknowledged that Donnellan's distinction [7] be- tween referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions must be taken into account in any theory of reference. There is not yet agreement, however, as to where the distinction fits in a theoretical model of definite noun phrases. For Cohen [4], the intention that the hearer identify a referent consti- tutes a crucial difference between the referential and the at- tributive. Barwise and Perry [3], on the other hand, treat their value-loaded/value-free distinction as the central feature of the referential versus the attributive. However, as pointed out by Grosz et al. [9], this analysis ignores an essential aspect of Donnellan's distinction, namely, the speaker's ability, when using a description referentially, to refer to an object that is independent of the semantic denotation. The problem of determining the correct interpretation of Donnellan's distinction is of considerable importance. First, Donnellan's distinction seems to violate the principle that ref- erence to physical objects is achieved by virtue of the descrip- tive content of referring expressions. This principle can be found practically everywhere -- for example, in Frege's sense and reference, Rusell's theory of descriptions, and Searle's speech acts. In the referential use of definite descriptions, however, reference seems to be established independently of descriptive content. If I say ~The man over there with a glass of white wine is..., ~ I may be successful in my act of referring -- regardless of whether the person over there is a man or a woman, the glass is full of wine or grape juice, the color of the beverage is white or red, and so on. This, if accepted, has far-reaching consequences for the meaning of referring ex- pressions, for the logical structure of propositions, and for the theory of propositional attitudes. Second, the referential/attributive distinction forces us to reconsider the division between semantics and pragmatics. It seems that a speaker's intentions in using a referring expression do make a semantic difference. If I say ~Smith's murderer is insane," meaning that whoever murdered Smith is insane (the attributive case), what I say is true if and only if the one and only murderer is insane. If, on the other hand, my intention is to use the definite description …

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