A Game-Theoretic Model of Metaphorical Bargaining
36141Authors
nan
Abstract
We present a game-theoretic model of bar- gaining over a metaphor in the context of political communication, find its equilib- rium, and use it to rationalize observed linguistic behavior. We argue that game theory is well suited for modeling dis- course as a dynamic resulting from a num- ber of conflicting pressures, and suggest applications of interest to computational linguists. 1
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Proceedings of the 48th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics, pages 698–709, Uppsala, Sweden, 11-16 July 2010. c⃝2010 Association for Computational Linguistics A Game-Theoretic Model of Metaphorical Bargaining Beata Beigman Klebanov Kellogg School of Management Northwestern University beata@northwestern.edu Eyal Beigman Washington University in St. Louis beigman@wustl.edu Abstract We present a game-theoretic model of bar- gaining over a metaphor in the context of political communication, find its equilib- rium, and use it to rationalize observed linguistic behavior. We argue that game theory is well suited for modeling dis- course as a dynamic resulting from a num- ber of conflicting pressures, and suggest applications of interest to computational linguists. 1 Introduction A 13 Dec 1992 article in The Times starts thus: The European train chugged out of the station last night; for most of the day it looked as if it might be stalled there for some time. It managed to pull away at around 10:30 pm only after the Spanish prime minister, Felipe Gonzalez, forced the passengers in the first class carriages into a last minute whip round to sweeten the trip for the European Community’s poor four: Spain, Portu- gal, Greece and Ireland. The fat controller, Helmut Kohl, beamed with satisfaction as the deal was done. The elegantly- suited Francois Mitterrand was equally satisfied. But nobody was as pleased as John Major, sta- tionmaster for the UK presidency, for whom the agreement marked a scarce high point in a bat- tered premiership. The departure had actually been delayed by seven months by Danes on the line. Just when that problem was solved, there was the volu- ble outbreak, orchestrated by Spain, from the poor four passengers demanding that they should travel free and be given spending money, too. The coupling of the carriages may not be reli- ably secure but the pan-European express is in motion. That few seem to agree the destination suggests that future arguments are inevitable at every set of points. Next stop: Copenhagen. Apart from an entertaining read, the extended metaphor provides an elaborate conceptual cor- respondence between a familiar domain of train journeys and the unfolding process of European integration. Carriages are likened to nation states; passengers to their peoples; treaties to stations; politicians to responsible rail company employees. In a compact form, the metaphor gives expres- sion to both the small and the large scale of the process. It provides for the recent history: Den- mark’s failure to ratify the 1992 Maastricht treaty until opt-outs were negotiated later that year is compared to dissenters sabotaging the journey by laying on the tracks (Danes on the line); nego- tiations over the Cohesion Fund that would pro- vide less developed regions with financial aid to help them comply with convergence criteria are likened to second class carriages with poor pas- sengers for whom the journey had to be subsi- dized. At a more general level, the European in- tegration is a purposeful movement towards some destination according to a worked out plan, get- ting …
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We present a game-theoretic model of bargaining over a metaphor in the context of political communication, find its equilibrium, and use it to rationalize observed linguistic behavior. We argue that game theory is well suited for modeling discourse as a dynamic resulting from a number of conflicting pressures, and suggest applications of interest to computational linguists. 1
Publication Details
- Paper ID:
- 36141
- Year:
- 2010
- Publication:
- TIPSTER
- Publication Type:
- conf
- DOI:
- nan